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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the US banking 
performance. Unconventional monetary policy is captured through the central bank’s assets 
and excess reserves. Results show that there is a negative relationship between unconventional 
monetary policy and bank performance. Dynamic threshold analysis identifies shifts in regimes 
of the unconventional monetary policy over time, and in particular in the aftermath of the 
financial credit crunch late in the last decade. This analysis reveals that the negative 
relationship between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance is particularly 
pronounced above the reported threshold value that identifies the two regimes. We employ also 
deposit insurance coverage in association with unconventional monetary policy and find that it 
has a significant negative effect on bank performance for deposit uninsured banks. Finally, we 
observe that the negative impact of unconventional monetary policy on performance is 
mitigated for banks with high asset diversification and low deposit funding.  
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1. Introduction 
Responding to the financial meltdown in 2008, the Federal Reserve (Fed) in the US has been 
actively engaged in monetary expansion of immense proportions. Only as part of the Fed’s 
large-asset purchase programmes trillions of the US long-term Treasury bonds and mortgage-
backed securities over the 2008-2013 period were purchased. It does not come as a surprise, 
therefore, that a lot of emphasis has been put in place by academics and policy makers alike on 
understanding the impact of unconventional monetary policy (Joyce et al., 2012; Miles, 2014; 
Svensson, 2014). Along these lines, there has been a growing literature that examines the effect 
of interest rates on the risk-taking of banks (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Delis et al., 2011; Altunbas 
et al., 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014).  
However, to date, there is rather limited evidence on the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy (UMP) on the performance of banks (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 
2014). This paper tries to bridge a gap in the existing literature by examining the underlying 
relationship between the unconventional monetary policies, as measured by central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves, on the US bank performance by taking into account the impact of 
bank-specific and country-level control variables. 
Although, there is a large volume of empirical literature regarding the broader economic impact 
of UMPs, there is rather limited evidence on the effect of UMPs on bank performance 
(Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). Mostly, since the first round of the 
Fed’s assets purchases in 2008, numerous studies offer explanations on the effectiveness of 
UMPs on asset prices, interest rates and a number of other macroeconomic variables 
(Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2012; Kapetanios et 
al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Swanson et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015; Rogers et al., 2014). 
Some studies employ high frequency data and look at the impact of Fed policy announcements 
on long term interest rates (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Swanson et al., 2014; 
D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright et al.,  2012) sovereign yields, stock prices and foreign exchange 
rates (Bowman et al., 2015; Rogers et al., 2014). Other studies look at the impact of UMPs on 
output and inflation (Kapetanios et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012). Some studies also investigate 
the association between UMP and financial stability (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013; 
Chodorow-reich, 2014). Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013) examine the effect of UMPs on 
corporate risk for commercial and investment banks over the 2008-2011 period. They conclude 
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that UMP increases corporate risk for the period under study. Similarly, Chodorow-reich (2014) 
examines the effect of UMPs on risk-taking for a sample of insurers, and mutual funds between 
2008 and 2013. The author finds some evidence of positive association between UMP and risk 
for the 2010-2013 period. The reported positive impact of UMP on bank risk-taking confirms 
the ‘portfolio balance’ channel that is introduced by Tobin (1963, 1969).2   
Turning now to the impact of UMP on bank performance this could be explained through its 
effect on bank interest margins which is an important source of bank profitability. Bank’s 
interest margin reflects the net interest income that arises from the difference between the short 
term (deposit) rate and long term (lending) rate (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). When the Fed has 
initiated UMPs, the short term interest rate has already reached the zero lower bounds. 
Furthermore, expansionary monetary policies are found to decrease long term interest rates 
(Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Swanson et al., 2014; D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright et 
al., 2012). Therefore, a reduction in the long term interest rates due to UMPs would decrease 
the difference between these long term interest rates and the short term interest rates that would 
consequently supress the interest margins.  Literature has pointed two channels for the UMPs, 
particularly LSAPs, to reduce long term interest rates. One is the ‘portfolio balance’ based on 
which Fed’s LSAPs could affect the long term interest rates through the reduction of the 
amount of long-term assets that the private sector holds (Joyce et al., 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011). 
The other is the ‘signalling’ channel through which LSAP might signal to market observes that 
the Fed has changed its views on policy preferences. This in turn might change bond investors’ 
expectations of the future short term interest rate resulting in lengthening period of the near-
zero federal fund rate. This signalling channel would decrease long term bond yields by 
reducing the average expected short-rate which is component of the long term rates (Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2013).  
However, the empirical evidence on the effect of UMP on bank profitability is rather scarce. 
In particular, we know of only two studies that focus on the underlying relationship between 
 
2 This theoretical framework, is particularly relevant in the case of LSAPs, in which financial institutions are 
engaged and thus ‘portfolio balance’ theory is a core mechanism that could explain the impact of UMP on bank 
risk (Steeley, 2015). Tobin (1963, 1969) suggests that central banks could decrease the relative returns of financial 
institutions by shifting supplies of assets with different maturities and liquidity due to imperfect substitutability. 
In particular, when a central bank buys assets from banks, the amount of cash that financial institutions hold 
increases. Since cash is not a perfect substitute for assets, banks  would put emphasis in rebalancing their portfolios 
by purchasing assets that are better substitutes and offer higher yield (Joyce et al., 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012). 
These assets would comprise riskier assets than cash, such as stocks and bonds that in turn would increase the 
undertaken risk of banks (Fisher, 2010; Fratzscher et al., 2014). 
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UMPs and bank profits (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). Montecino 
and Epstein (2014) find that LSAPs, as proxied by a ‘counterparty treatment variable’, increase 
bank profitability but this effect is robust only for the large US banks. Furthermore, Lambert 
and Ueda (2014) investigate the impact of UMPs, as captured by the central bank’s assets over 
gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, on bank profits for a sample of the US commercial banks 
over the 2007Q3-2012Q3 period. They find that UMPs exerts a negative effect on bank profits 
and thus they raise questions concerning the effectiveness of expansionary policies on the 
performance of financial institutions.  
Both these two studies (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014) do not find a 
strong positive association between UMPs and bank performance. Unconventional monetary 
policies took place in the US after the burst of the financial crisis aiming to boost the wider 
economy, thus when one examines the impact of these policies on bank performance should 
take into account also the regulation framework that is particularly associated with the deposit 
runs of banks. In detail, as a response to the financial crisis, numerous countries increased 
significantly the coverage of their financial safety nets aiming to prevent potential contagion 
defaults on the banking sector. In particular, a recent study by Anginer et al. (2013) shows that 
during good times the deposit insurance has a negative impact on bank stability due to the 
increase of the moral hazard, while over periods of economic crisis the impact of deposit 
insurance coverage on bank stability is positive because of the ‘stabilization effect’. Therefore, 
when we examine the impact of the unconventional monetary policy on bank performance and 
we should include also the effect of the deposit insurance coverage particularly during 
economic downturns when contagious bank defaults are more likely to take place.  
The paper contributes in the existing literature through various ways. Firstly, we shed new light 
on the underlying relationship between the unconventional monetary policy and bank 
performance as estimated by a number of accounting ratios for a sample of US banks over the 
2007Q2-2013Q2 period. Secondly, we test how deposit insurance coverage affects the 
performance of banks over this period, while we also examine whether the impact of UMP on 
bank performance changes for Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage (FDIC)-insured institutions. 
Thirdly, we also use a dynamic threshold methodology to identify possible threshold-effects of 
UMPs with respect to bank performance over a period of significant structural changes for the 
banking institutions as well as for the entire economy. Fourthly, we test whether the effect of 
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UMPs on bank performance varies based on different levels of bank asset diversification and 
deposit funding. 
Our findings suggest a strong negative relationship between UMPs, as proxied by central 
bank’s asset and excess reserves, and the US bank performance over the 2007Q2- 2013Q2. 
Moreover, we find that the impact of deposit insurance coverage on performance is negative 
across the majority of our specifications, suggesting the presence of the moral hazard effect. In 
addition, we find that the negative effect of UMP on bank performance is moderated for the 
FDIC-insured institutions over turbulent periods. In crisis times, when UMP is used, depositors 
of FDIC-uninsured institutions would demand higher deposit interest rates compared to 
depositors of FDIC-insured banks. Therefore, higher deposit interest rates reduces further 
interest margins and bank profitability for FDIC-uninsured banks, while this effect is less 
pronounced for deposit insured institutions. Dynamic threshold analysis demonstrates that the 
negative effect of UMP on bank performance is particularly enhanced above the identified 
threshold value of UMP that classifies two regimes. Finally, we find that the negative effect of 
UMP on performance is less pronounced for banks of high asset diversification and low deposit 
funding.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 introduces the data, while section 4 discusses the methodology and the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses to be tested. 
In this section we develop the three main hypotheses of our study; i) the first tests the impact 
of the unconventional monetary policy on bank performance ii) the second examines the effect 
of deposit coverage insurance on the performance iii) while the third looks at the impact of 
UMP on bank performance for deposit insured banks. We test these propositions for a sample 
of US commercial and saving banks over the crisis period (2007Q2-2013Q2).  
 
2.1.Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Performance 
The existing literature on the effects of UMPs on bank performance is rather limited, while 
there is a large discussion on the impact of monetary policy via interest rates on net interest 
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margins on banking institutions. Following the hypothesis advanced by Samuelson (1945), 
known as the ‘Samuelson effect’, changes in interest rates affects bank performance, and more 
specifically profitability, via their effect on bank interest margins. In other words, when interest 
rates are very low banks’ revenues from loans are reduced, while the bank’s interest expenses 
from saving deposits are not decreased to the same extent, because banks’ portfolio consist 
primarily of demand and transaction deposits. In similar vein, Hancock (1985) shows that an 
increase in interest rates result in an increase of bank profitability, as lending rate elasticity is 
larger than the deposit rate elasticity. Trying to bridge a link between UMPs and interest 
margins is imperative to understand the effect of the non-standard monetary policies on the 
long term interest rates on which banks lend money to borrowers. It is established in the 
literature that UMPs, particularly via LSAPs, decrease long term interest rates and thus 
decrease the difference between the federal fund rate (short term interest rate) and long term 
interest rates (Gagnon, et al., 2013; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; 
Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Therefore, due to the documented 
larger elasticity of the lending rate compared to the deposit rate (Hancock, 1985), the reduction 
of long term interest rates could consequently lead to a faster decrease of revenues than interest 
expenses arising from deposits.  
Furthermore, one of the leading theoretical models for the determination of interest margins is 
the bank dealership model as developed by Ho and Saunders (1981).3 According to this model, 
banks are risk-averse financial intermediaries that face an inventory risk which arises from the 
mismatch between liabilities and assets. This risk has to be compensated via the pure interest 
spread, the difference between loan and deposit rates. Ho and Saunders (1981) suggest that the 
interest margin is dependent, among others, on the volatility of interest rates signifying that 
increases of interest rate volatility rise interest margins. A subsequent study by McShane and 
Sharpe (1984) finds that the bank interest margin is positively related to interest rate volatility.  
In support of the above argument, Maudos and Guevara (2006) empirically confirm a 
significant relationship between interest rate volatility and interest margins. Following 
previous findings (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2013), UMPs particularly via LSAPs, decrease long term interest rates. This in 
turn suggests that the difference between long and short term interest rates reduces. As a result, 
 
3 This model is based on the grounds of the hedging hypothesis that banks seek to match the maturities of liabilities 
(deposits) and assets (loans) aiming to avoid the reinvestment or refinancing costs that increase when assets are 
either too long or too short. 
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when interest rates decrease they tend to converge to zero-low bounds and consequently 
interest rate volatility reduces. Indeed, Krisnamurthy and Jorgensen (2011) find that UMP 
decreases interest rate volatility as estimated by the implied volatility on swaptions. Therefore, 
low interest rate volatility over expansionary monetary periods might be negatively associated 
with interest margins and bank profits as in Maudos’s and Guevara (2006) study. Furthermore, 
the reduced volatility tend to motivate banks to undertake riskier positions that could result in 
lower bank performance (Borio and Zhu, 2012).       
Another mechanism through which UMPs could affect the performance of banking institutions 
is through the reduction of the maturity mismatching risk. When UMP is employed banks could 
benefit from the lower term premium and issue long-term debt to substitute short term debt, 
thus prolonging the maturity of their liabilities and decreasing the risk of maturity mismatches 
(Stein, 2012). In support of this argument, Lambert and Ueda (2014) find that UMPs, via 
central bank’s assets, lower the short-term debt ratio of the US depository institutions. Thus, 
reduction in the maturity mismatch risk would reduce resources and costs that banks devote in 
associated monitoring operations. These resources would then be diverted into operations that 
could further improve bank performance (Berger and DeYoung, 1997).4 This issuance of long 
term debt could also occur at lower funding cost as LSAP found to reduce bank bond yields 
(Gagnon et al., 2013; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek , 2013). In support of this argument, Santos (2014) 
finds that the UMPs reduces the funding cost of large banks that trade bonds. Moreover, the 
Fed’s purchases of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) from depository institutions, suggests 
that the central bank might have subsided banks’ funding cost to fund these mortgages 
(Kandrac and Schlusche, 2015). 
In addition, since the Fed’s LSAPs has increased banks’ cash holdings, market participants 
might consider this injection of liquidity to depository institutions as an implicit guarantee for 
the well-functioning of the banking industry and might decrease bank’s cost of funding 
(Montecino and Epstein, 2014). However, depository institutions that have been engaged in 
LSAP, might regard cash provided by the Fed as a safety net (Hancock and Passmore, 2014) 
which might give an increase in moral hazard (Calomiris and Kane, 1996). Under the ‘moral 
hazard’ hypothesis managers undertake excessive risk and demonstrate inadequate asset 
 
4According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) an increase of risk could lead to a decrease of bank performance. The 
reason is that bank managers divert resources from day to day operations in screening and monitoring activities 
that would consequently increase the associated costs. 
8 
 
 
screening that in turn might result in higher level of non-performing loans (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004). This rise in the number of nonperforming loans could lead 
to an increase of unpaid loans, suggesting that these assets have offered low profits to financial 
institutions (Miller and Noulas, 1997). 
 Unconventional monetary policy, could also affect bank’s cost of capital (Chang and Song, 
2014). In some detail, LSAPs might have rebuilt market confidence and decrease investor’s 
risk aversion (Bekaert et al., 2013; Roache and Rousset, 2013). Thus, if investors are 
characterized by lower levels of risk-aversion are thus willing to undertake increased risk for a 
lower required return on stocks. This reduction in the cost of capital (required return) would 
lead to an increase in future cash flows and stock prices of banks (Chang and Song, 2014). 
Also, the decrease of market uncertainty would boost asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014). 
Thus, this growth in asset prices might have a positive effect on the income that stems from 
bank’s trading operations. However, as bank managers tend to be less risk-averse over 
expansionary monetary periods (Bekaert et al., 2013) this might reduce risk-monitoring of 
trading operations and prompt them to undertake less beneficial positions for the performance 
of the bank. 
Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication on the effect of UMP on bank 
performance, thus the hypothesis H1.A and the competing hypothesis H1.B are formed as 
follows: 
H1A (H1.B): The impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance could be 
negative (positive). 
2.2 Deposit Coverage Insurance, UMP and Bank Performance  
In response to the financial crisis, a number of countries have considerably raised the coverage 
of their financial safety nets aiming to reinstate the market confidence and to avoid contagion 
effects on the banking industry (Anginer et al., 2013). Deposit insurance coverage is a 
regulatory measure that could prove to be considerably effective during financial crises 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The reason being that deposit insurance reduces the risk of 
depositor runs (Matutes and Vives, 1996). In support of this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) 
find that the increase of deposit insurance coverage decreases bank risk in European Union. 
Also, there is empirical evidence to suggest that deposit insurance coverage is associated with 
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enhanced financial intermediation, as estimated by the level of deposits (Chernykh and Cole, 
2011). In similar vein, Anginer et al. (2013) find that the deposit insurance coverage offers 
important stabilization effects over the period of the crisis (2007-2009) for a sample of 4109 
banks in 96 countries. However, there are counterarguments of the negative impact of deposit 
insurance on bank stability and performance. Specifically, too generous or unsuitably priced 
deposit insurance schemes might increase moral hazard by incentivizing banks to undertake 
disproportionate risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014). 
Anginer et al. (2013) demonstrate that the deposit insurance coverage is negatively related with 
the bank stability during tranquil periods (2004-2007). Moreover, Barth et al. (2013) find that 
deposit insurance coverage is negatively associated with the performance, as estimated by 
efficiency, for a sample of 4050 banks over the 1999-2007 period. Thus, a generous deposit 
insurance scheme would deteriorate banks’ stability and performance.  
Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication on the effect of deposit insurance on 
bank performance, thus the hypothesis H2.A and the competing hypothesis H2.B are formed 
as follows: 
H2.A (H2.B): The impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank performance is negative 
(positive) 
Based on the above discussion that deposit insurance could have a stabilizing or a negative 
effect on performance, it would be interesting to explore the impact of the interaction of deposit 
insurance with UMP on bank performance. Drawing from the arguments in the previous section 
(2.1), one major channel through which expansionary monetary policy could affect bank 
performance is by the reduction in the interest margins that arises from the decrease in long 
term interest rate when the short term rate (fed fund rate) is close to the zero lower bound 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013).  
The bank interest margins could further decrease in the absence of deposit insurance. This is 
because banks of not insured depositors tend to charge higher interest rates aiming to reduce 
bank risk resulting in the decrease of bank’s interest margin (Anginer et al., 2013). On the 
contrary, if deposits are insured, depositors lack incentives to monitor and consequently charge 
lower interest rates (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Thus a further decrease in the 
interest margins of banks because of the monitoring of depositors could occur for non-deposit 
insured banks. In this case, the negative (positive) effect of UMP on bank performance would 
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be moderated (strengthened) for deposit insured banks. However, the “moral hazard” effect of 
deposit insurance could dominate in the interaction of deposit insurance with UMP. At the 
presence of lower margins due to unconventional monetary policy, insured banks might search 
for higher returns by lending credit to customers of low creditworthiness that could charge 
higher lending interest rates (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). Although, these loans carry higher 
interest rates they could lead to a higher default rate and thus lower bank performance 
(Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). In this case the negative (positive) effect of UMP on performance 
would be strengthened (moderated) for banks with deposit insurance.    
Based on the above discussion hypothesis H3.A and the competing hypothesis H3.B would be 
formulated as follows:    
H3.A The positive (negative) impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance 
is strengthened (moderated) for deposit insured institutions 
And  
H3.B: The positive (negative) impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance 
is moderated (strengthened) for deposit insured institutions 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
We use quarterly financial data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database for a period that 
covers the financial crisis 2007Q2-2013Q2. Our final sample includes 6771 US commercial 
and saving banks and a total 88,888 observations, after removing errors and inconsistencies. 
Table 1 describes all dependent and explanatory variables employed in the empirical analysis.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
          3.1. Unconventional monetary policy and deposit insurance coverage variables 
 
Since 2009, the Fed has conducted a number of LSAPs rounds that includes primarily Treasury 
securities and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In 2014, the Fed purchased almost $2.5 and 
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$1.7 trillion of Treasury securities and MBS respectively. This had as a result the expansion of 
the Fed's balance sheet by almost five times compared with the size of it before the crisis. 
Consequently, UMPs through LSAPs have increased substantially both the asset and liability 
side of the Fed’s balance sheet. A number of previous studies highlight that the size of central 
bank’s assets is an appropriate measure of UMPs and indeed is found to influence the prices of 
specific assets (Gagnon et al., 2011; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; 
D’Amico and King, 2013; Gambacorta et al., 2014), while Lambert and Ueda (2014) 
demonstrate its significant effect on the profitability of the US banks. Similarly, we use the 
natural logarithm of central bank’s assets (CBA) to capture the expansion of the Fed’s balance 
sheet from the asset side.  
Moreover, the expansion of the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet due to the initiation of 
the LSAPs has led to a significant increase of excess reserves hold by banks (Todd, 2013).  
Excess reserves stand for the extra amount of reserves against deposits and other liabilities that 
banks hold above the required reserves that the federal law suggests. In particular, excess 
reserves increased sharply since the late 2008 in the US. In 2007, excess reserves averaged 
$1.9 billion, while by April 2014 reached around $1.863 trillion, of which only around $115 
billion are required reserves. This large increase of excess reserves is reflected by its high 
standard deviation (1.04) over the period under study 2007Q2-2013Q2 (see Table 2). Moreover, 
this substantial growth in excess reserves has also been driven by an important policy change; 
since 2008 the Fed has started to pay interest on reserves. This in turn has encouraged banks to 
maintain large amount of excess reserves. In addition, paying interest on reserves allows the 
central bank to put a floor on the federal funds rate, as banks will not want to lend out their 
reserves at rates lower than those that they can earn from the Fed (Kozicki et al., 2011). This 
in turn offers the ability to the Open Market Trading Desk (Desk) at the Fed to maintain the 
federal fund rate very close to the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target rate 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013). Therefore, we also use as a second proxy of UMP, 
the natural logarithm of excess reserves (EXC_RES) consistent with Bech and Monnet (2013).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition, in order to account for the effect of the deposit insurance coverage we employ a 
comprehensive dataset that provides bank-specific information on all the FDIC-insured 
institutions. Also, it offers valuable evidence on the particular date that a bank has gained 
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access into the FDIC that in turn captures time heterogeneity.5 Thus, we include a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 for those banks (and years) that deposits are insured, while takes the value 
of 0 for these banks (and years) that do not have access to the FDIC. The increase of deposit 
insurance coverage is particularly evident the recent years is depicted by the mean value of the 
FDIC dummy variable that is equal to 0.65, thus more than the half of our sample includes 
FDIC-insured financial institutions (Table 2).   
 
      3.2. Control Variables 
We employ a number of bank-specific and state-specific variables consistent with a number of 
previous empirical studies. We use the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of 
each bank (SIZE). The existing empirical evidence on the effect of the size on bank 
performance is mixed (Altunbas et al., 2001; DeGuevara and Maudos, 2007). On the one hand, 
bank size might have a positive effect on bank performance due to higher diversification 
(Mester, 1993). On the other hand, the impact of bank size on bank performance could be 
negative if economies of scope and scale are not realized. We also include the equity over total 
assets ratio as a proxy of capital (E/TA), as in previous studies (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Lepetit et al., 2008). The impact of the equity over total assets ratio on bank performance could 
be positive, as more capital at risk prompts managers to undertake less risky positions that in 
turn would protect banks from increased losses (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Athanasoglou et al., 
2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). On the other hand, an increase of leverage, which implies a decrease 
of capital, might have a positive impact on bank performance under the ‘agency cost’ 
hypothesis introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This is because increases of leverage 
(decreases of capital) could moderate the conflicts that shareholders and managers have with 
regards to the risk of an investment choice (Myers, 1977). When leverage increases the priority 
of managers is to secure funding to pay the debt rather to undertake extremely risky projects 
(Myers, 1977). Hence, high leverage (low capital) could have a positive impact on bank 
performance, consistent with Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). We also account for the 
impact of liquidity on bank performance estimated by the ratio of liquid assets over total assets 
(LIQ/TA). Previous empirical studies show that the impact of liquidity on performance could 
 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for pointing out the necessity to use an informative measure of 
FDIC that would enable us to capture bank and time heterogeneity. Data for all the FDIC-insured institutions are 
available here: https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp.  
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be positive due to the lower liquidity risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou 
et al., 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest that the effect could be negative since high 
liquidity is associated with low returns (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) and high storage 
expenses (Kwan, 2003). Furthermore, we opt for the ratio of loans to assets (LA/TA) which is 
a proxy for well-functioning intermediation by the bank and is extensively used by previous 
studies (Pasiouras, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Bertay et al., 2013). 
Lastly, we also account for the insolvency risk as estimated by the Z-Score= (1+ ROE)/σROE, 
where ROE is the return on equity and σROE is the estimate of standard deviation of ROE (Boyd 
and Graham, 1986). Higher values of Z-Score for a bank indicates higher distance from default 
and therefore we expect that increases of Z-Score would have a positive impact on bank 
performance consistent with numerous previous studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Delis and 
Staikouras, 2011). Lastly, we also include the ratio of non- performing loans over total loans 
at the US state level (NPLs), in order to capture the state-specific credit risk.6  
Turning now to the rest of the control variables, we opt for a number of macroeconomic 
variables to capture the general economic conditions. 7 Thus, as proxies of macroeconomic 
stability we include in our regressions gross domestic product growth (GDP gr) and inflation 
(INFL) consistent with previous studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Chortareas et al., 
2011; Mamatzakis and Kalyvas, 2013). On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to support 
that favorable economic conditions, i.e. high GDP growth, can increase banking expenses 
owing to higher operating costs to offer a particular level of services (Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas, 2000). Also, banks tend to increase their lending through shifting to riskier assets aiming 
to rise their returns. This in turn might dampen bank performance in the long run (Delis and 
Kouretas, 2010). On the other hand, an increase of GDP growth could reduce banking costs 
and thus increase profitability due to the easy access that banks in prosperous countries have 
to new technologies (Lensink et al., 2008).  
Regarding the effect of inflation on bank performance, Revell (1979) claims that it depends on 
whether bank’s salaries and other operating expenses could increase at a faster (lower) degree 
than the inflation rate. Thus, if a bank’s management could predict the inflation rate, a bank 
could adapt interest rates in order to increase revenues faster than costs and hence improve 
 
6For the state-level non-performing loans ratio we obtained the data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
7We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer who proposed to introduce variables such as GDP growth, 
inflation and unemployment rate, aiming to capture the effect of general economic conditions on bank 
performance. 
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bank performance. In contrast, if bank managers could not accurately predict the inflation rate 
that would not result in appropriate adjustment of interest rates. In that case, bank costs would 
increase at a higher level than earnings resulting in the reduction of bank performance. 
Moreover, we include as another measure of economic conditions the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP). The impact of UNEMP on bank performance is expected to be negative consistent 
with Abreu and Mendes (2002). We also control for the effect of monetary policy, including 
the federal fund rate (Fed rate). The impact of Fed rate on bank performance is expected to be 
positive. In particular, lower interest rates tend to increase risk-taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; 
Brissimis and Delis, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2013) that in turn might dampen bank performance. 
 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1.1 Fixed effect estimator 
As a first step of the empirical analysis we run the following general model with the fixed effect 
estimator: 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑐 + 𝑎1(𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑡 + 𝑎2(𝐷𝐼𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 +𝑢𝑖,𝑡]          (1)                                                                    
where (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡  is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance 
estimated by four different proxies; 1) return on assets (ROA), 2) return on equity (ROE), 3) 
pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets  (POI), 4) and net interest 
margin (NIM). 𝑐 is the constant term , (𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑡  stands for the unconventional monetary policy 
independent variable. (𝐷𝐼𝐶)𝑖,𝑡  is a dummy variable that captures the deposit protection and 
takes the value of 1 for the FDIC-insured banks, otherwise it takes the value of 0. (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 
comprises a number of bank-specific, state-level and country-level control variables, 𝑣𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank specific effect,  while 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic  error term.  
Fixed effect estimator is an appropriate method in the context of our study as we use a panel 
dataset.8 In particular, with fixed effect estimation we take into account heterogeneity across 
banks as it allows unobserved bank specific characteristics,  𝑣𝑖, to be arbitrarily correlated with 
the observed explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2008).  Therefore, bank fixed effects,   𝑣𝑖, capture 
heterogeneity across banks as bank-individual characteristics are not constrained and could  
 
8 We use the Hausman (Hausman, 1978) test that rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect 
estimator (and not random effect) is the preferred estimation method.   
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impact upon the predictor variables Fixed effect wipes out the impact of time-invariant 
characteristics and hence we could examine the net effect of UMPs and the rest of our 
explanatory variables on bank performance.9  
 
4.1.2 Fixed effect panel results 
The fixed effect estimations reveal that the unconventional monetary policy, as estimated by 
two different proxies, exerts a significant and negative impact on bank performance in support 
of our H1.A hypothesis. In particular, unconventional monetary policy, as measured by central 
bank’s assets (CBA), has a significant negative impact on bank performance across all different 
specifications (ROE, ROA, NIM, POI). Similar results we observe when we use excess 
reserves (EXC_RES) as an alternative measure of UMP. Also, the EXC_RES exerts a negative 
effect on bank performance at the 1% level across all our regression models (Table 3). Mostly, 
we observe that CBA exerts a larger in magnitude impact on bank performance compared to 
that of EXC_RES.  Overall, these findings reveal that there is a strong negative association 
between UMP and bank performance. This result is supported by the effect that UMP could 
have on net interest margins of banking institutions. In particular, over the monetary 
expansionary periods, the deposit rates (federal fund rate) has been kept at zero lower bounds. 
Also, LSAPs are found to reduce the lending rates (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; 
Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Thus, UMP has prone to the depression 
of net interest margins. Thus, one mechanism though which UMP affects negatively bank 
performance is through its impact on net interest margins. Another channel through which 
UMP impacts bank performance is through its impact on asset prices. In some detail, the Fed’s 
purchases is regarded by market participants as a signal of the deterioration of financial 
prospects which effects adversely the value of trading assets and portfolio gains (Christensen 
and Rudebusch, 2013).    
  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
9 Heterogeneity over time is captured using time dummies. 
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Turning to the other variable of our main interest, we observe that federal deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) is negatively associated with bank performance as estimated by different 
accounting-based indicators across all our specifications. In some detail, the effect of deposit 
insurance coverage is negative and significant at the 1% level across the majority of our 
regression models (see Table 3) confirming in that way our H2.A. Notably, we observe that the 
FDIC exerts an economically important effect on bank performance as the estimated 
coefficients for the regressions of ROA, NIM and POI are large in magnitude.  These findings 
suggest that deposit insured institutions grant credit regardless the costs arising from relaxed 
standards and monitoring. As such, banks increase the level of defaulted loans, thereby 
increasing costs and depressing interest margins (Abreu and Mendes, 2001). 
In addition, we go a step further and investigate what is the impact of the interaction of UMP 
with deposit insurance coverage on bank performance. Our results show that the negative 
impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance, as discussed above, is less 
pronounced for FDIC-insured financial institutions. In some detail, the interaction of the 
deposit insurance coverage with the two alternative measures of UMP, CBA*FDIC and 
EXC_RES*FDIC, enters the regressions positive and significant (Table 3), suggesting that 
negative effects of UMP on bank performance is moderated for FDIC-insured banks 
confirming our H3.A hypothesis. In some detail, this impact is more robust for those 
specifications where we employ EXC_RES as a measure of UMP. As we discussed earlier, one 
of the major channels through which UMP could affect bank performance is through its impact 
on interest margins. Our results show that bank depositors of FDIC-insured banks lack 
incentives to monitor and thus they charge lower deposit rates compared to that of non-insured 
depositors (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). This suggests that a further reduction of 
interest margins due to UMP is moderated by the presence of deposit insurance.  
Turning to the impact of the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we find that the bank 
SIZE increases bank performance as estimated by the ROA, ROE, NIM and POI ratios. In 
some detail, the SIZE is positively associated with bank performance (see Table 3). These 
results show that increases in the bank size offer diversification benefits to banks through 
economies of scale and scope (Mester, 1993). In addition, we find that LA/TA increases bank 
performance. In particular, we find that LA/TA has a positive and significant impact on bank 
performance at the 1% significance level (see Table 3). Our results indicate that increases of 
the ratio of loans stands for the well-functioning intermediation of banks. Our findings are also 
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consistent with these of previous empirical studies (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 
2004; Lensink et al., 2008).  
With regards to the impact of capital, E/TA, on bank performance we observe that increases of 
capital improves bank profitability across all the specifications (see Table 3). In particular, we 
find that E/TA exerts a positive and significant effect at the 1% level on ROE and ROA (see 
Table 3). These findings suggest that increased capital prompts managers to take less risky 
positions that consequently protect banks from high losses (Gorton and Rosen, 1995). Our 
finding is similar to that of Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Lepetit et al. (2008). We also find 
that the impact of LIQ/TA is negative on bank profitability, suggesting that banks which hold 
high liquid assets are related with low returns (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) and high storage 
expenses (Kwan, 2003).  
In addition, we examine the impact of the insolvency risk, as estimated by the Z-Score, on bank 
performance. Our findings demonstrate, that an increase of the Z-Score (decrease of risk to 
default) improves bank profitability as proxied by the two alternative measures of UMP. In 
particular, we observe that there is a strong positive relationship between the Z-Score and bank 
performance at the 1% significance level (see Table 3). Our empirical results are in line with a 
number of previous studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Delis and Staikouras, 2011) 
and suggests that banks with high default risk (lower Z-Score) divert resources from day-to-
day to monitoring operations that in turn can increase bank expenses and thus reduce banks 
profitability consistent with the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis advanced by Berger and DeYoung 
(1997). Lastly, regarding the impact of the state-level ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans on bank performance we observe, as it is expected, a negative sign and significant at the 
1% across the majority of the specifications (see Table 3).   
Regarding the impact of country-level control variables, we find that GDP gr exerts a negative 
effect on bank performance consistent with previous studies (Yildirim and Philipatos, 2007; 
Delis and Kouretas, 2010). This in turn suggests that in prosperous economic conditions 
banking costs increase due to higher operating expenses to supply a given level of services 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Moreover, we find that INFL exerts a negative and 
significant effect on bank performance in line with previous empirical evidence (Wallich, 1977; 
Petersen, 1986; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). The reason being that bank’s management 
cannot accurately predict inflation rate and consequently cannot adjust interest rates 
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equivalently. Thus, bank expenses increase at a faster pace than revenues suggesting the 
decrease of bank profits (Revell, 1979). Moreover, we observe a negative association between 
UEMP and bank performance as in Abreu and Mendes (2002). Finally, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between Fed rate and performance confirming the increase of risk 
taking that arise from low interest rates (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Brissimis and Delis, 2009; 
Jimenez et al., 2013).    
      4.2.1 Dynamic estimations 
In order to test our main hypotheses (H1, H2 & H3), we opt for the two-step ‘system’ GMM 
estimator (Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) as in Lambert and Ueda (2014) 
that examines the impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance. The usage 
of this estimator is appropriate in the context of this study as it accounts for endogeneity issues. 
10  Moreover, the well-documented persistence in bank profits (Goddard et al., 2004) is 
controlled by the inclusion of the performance-lagged dependent variable amongst the rest of 
the determinants (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also follow the finite sample correction 
introduced by Windmeijer (2005) as the two-step estimates of standards errors tend to be 
downward biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The dynamic panel model that we use takes the following form: 
(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑐 + 𝜑(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1(𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑡 + 𝑎2(𝐷𝐼𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑣𝑖+𝑢𝑖,𝑡]                                                                                                (2), 
where (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance  as 
estimated by ROA, ROE, POI and NIM, while  (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)𝑖,𝑡−1  stands for the lagged 
performance independent variable. (𝑈𝑀𝑃)𝑡  is the variable that captures the unconventional 
monetary policy. (𝐷𝐼𝐶)𝑖,𝑡  is a bank specific dummy variable that accounts for the deposit 
protection and  takes the value of 1, while takes the value of 0 for non FDIC-insured institutions. 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 includes bank-specific, state-level and country-level control variables, 𝑣𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank specific effect ,while 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic error term. 
 
 
10For the ‘system’ GMM estimation we use Roodman  (2006)  “xtabond 2” specification in Stata. 
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4.2.2 Dynamic panel results 
Table 4 shows the regression results of the dynamic panel analysis with the central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves, as unconventional monetary policy variables. The suitability of the 
usage of the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is justified by the significant lagged dependent 
performance variables in all the corresponding models (see Table 4). In addition, with respect 
to statistical diagnostics we observe that the second-order autocorrelation in second differences 
and the Hansen test are insignificant (see Table 4). 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
With regards to the impact of the UMP, as estimated by CBA and EXC_RES, on bank 
performance we observe that it remains negative and significant. In particular, we find that the 
CBA and EXC_RES exerts a negative and significant impact on bank performance at the (see 
Table 4). Largely, we find that the effect of CBA on performance is larger in magnitude 
compared to that of EXC_RES. These findings lend further support to the results of the fixed 
effects specifications, suggesting that UMPs dampen bank performance. These results also 
provide evidence of the negative effect of UMP on bank performance through its effect on 
interest margins. Briefly, it is documented that LSAPs decrease the lending rates 
(Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). 
Thus, this reduction of lending rates affect negatively net interest margins and bank 
performance.  The negative effect of UMP on bank performance through its impact on asset 
prices. Announcements of LSAPs signal downturn of future economic conditions which is 
considered negative information by investors which affect adversely asset prices (Christensen 
and Rudebusch, 2013).     
Turning now to the impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank performance, we find a 
negative result, which is consistent with the fixed effect specifications and further confirms the 
negative effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank performance. Banks of insured 
depositors tend to relax credit standards and decrease monitoring that in turn give a rise in the 
level of nonperforming loans. This increase of problem loans suggest rise of costs and thus 
deterioration of bank performance (Abreu and Mendes, 2001). With regards to the impact of 
interaction of the deposit insurance coverage with UMP, as estimated by CBA*FDIC and 
EXC_RES*FDIC, on performance we find supportive evidence of the fixed effect results, 
showing that the negative impact of the UMP on bank performance is less pronounced for 
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FDIC-insured institutions (see Table 4). Overall, we find that the CBA*FDIC exerts larger in 
magnitude effect on bank performance compared to that of EXC_RES*FDIC. UMP decreases 
bank performance through the reduction in interest margins. The further reduction of interest 
margins is moderated when bank depositors are insured as they charge lower interest rates 
compared to that of uninsured depositors (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004).  
Regarding the impact of the rest of the control bank-specific variables, we observe that the 
results are consistent with the fixed effect specifications. In some detail, we observe a positive 
relationship between the SIZE of the bank and performance (see Table 4) and consistent with 
Mester (1993). Furthermore, we find that the LA/TA ratio is positively associated with bank 
performance (see Table 4), consistent with the fixed effect specifications and previous 
empirical evidence (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Lensink et al., 2008). 
In addition, as in the fixed effect estimator, we find that the Z-Score exerts a positive impact 
on bank performance across all our models (see Table 4), consistent with previous empirical 
evidence (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Finally, we also observe 
a strong negative association between NPLs and bank performance (see Table 4). Moreover, 
we find that GDP gr, INFL and UEMP exerts a negative effect on bank performance in line 
with fixed effect specifications and previous empirical evidence. Finally, the Fed rate enters 
the regression positive and significant confirming our previous findings (4.1.2). 
      4.3.1 Dynamic Panel Threshold Model  
As a further step, we opt for a dynamic panel threshold model that enables us to identify any 
regime shifts due to UMP. In some detail, we build on the dynamic panel threshold model of 
Kremer et al. (2013) based on the cross-sectional balanced panel threshold methodology 
introduced by Hansen (1999). This model identifies changes in coefficients of the main 
regressors of our interest, whilst it detects thresholds and thereby different regimes 
endogenously without ex ante imposing structural breaks. A major criticism in the literature 
(Jimenez et al., 2008; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Ioannidou et al., 2015) refers to 
endogeneity of monetary policy measures on bank performance. Our model deals with this 
issue as the estimation method is GMM based on instrumental variables. In addition, the data 
information set would reveal if and when there is a break in the data generating process, rather 
than imposing arbitrarily a structural break in the data as in Klapper and Love (2011) and 
Anginer et al. (2014). This is of importance as during the period f our sample, there is major 
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financial crisis, but to this date it is not clear when commercial banks were affected by the 
crisis. Our model identifies thresholds for central bank’s assets and excess reserves and their 
impact on bank performance over the period of our study (2007Q2-2013Q2). Based on the 
estimation of threshold we would be able to identify the exact date of the structural break, and 
detect possible shifts (see Hansen 1999; Kremer et al. 2013).    
The threshold model takes the following form11: 
performi,t = μi + λ1mi,t I(qi,t ≤ γ) + δ1Ι(qi,t ≤ γ) + λ2mi,t I(qi,t > γ) + εi,t   ,  (3)        
 
where performi,t is the dependent variable and stands for the ROA, ROE, POI and NIM.  μi is 
the bank-specific fixed effect, while λ
1
 and λ
2
 stand for the two reverse regression slopes 
based on the assumption that there exist two regimes, ε
it
 is the random error. mit is a vector 
of explanatory variables  that include both bank-specific,  state-level and country-level control 
variables. δ1 is the regime dependent intercept and as in Bick (2007) its inclusion is essential 
for estimating both the threshold value and the coefficient magnitudes of the two regimes. I is 
the indicator function suggesting the regime specified by the threshold variable qit and the 
threshold value γ. 
The εi,t
∗  takes the following transformation: 
εi,t
∗ = √
T−t
T−t+1
 [εi,t −
1
T−t
(εi(t+1) + ⋯ + εi,T)]                                                             (4)   
In the equation (3) the threshold variable is qit , and herein refers to two measures of 
unconventional monetary policy; i) central bank’s assets ii) excess reserves. γ is the threshold 
value which would indicate those observations above (high regime) and below the threshold 
value (low regime).The above dynamic panel threshold model employs a GMM estimation 
method (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Caner and Hansen, 2004) so as to address issues related 
to endogeneity and avoid the serial correlation in the transformed errors.   
The estimation of the threshold variable follows a two-step procedure; in the first step the 
estimation of a reduced type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of instruments 
takes place. The predicted values are then used to replace the endogenous variable in the 
 
11For simplicity we outline the threshold model based on two identified regimes and one threshold. Without loss 
of generality, this model could expand to more thresholds and thereby more regimes. 
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equation (3). Next we estimate equation (3) for a fixed threshold value where the threshold 
variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. Threshold values are 
specified by the minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors as γi
∗ = argminγ Si(γ) 
(Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Lastly, slope coefficients λ
1
 and λ
2
 could be estimated with the 
use of the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
4.3.2 Dynamic threshold results 
If a central bank intends to initiate higher levels of UMPs, through more large scale asset 
purchases, bank investors are then more easily persuaded about the future policies of the central 
bank and thus their beliefs that interest rates would remain low for a long period become 
stronger (Bernanke et al., 2004). Eggertson and Woodford (2003) suggest that UMPs could 
prove to be beneficial in decreasing bond yields only if these policies function as a credible 
commitment by the central bank to retain interest rates low. Clouse et al. (2003) suggests that 
this commitment becomes more credible if central bank purchases large volumes of MBS and 
Treasury bills. In particular, Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) finds that a LSAP announcement 
result in the lengthening of the expected period of near-zero policy rates. The reason is that if 
a central bank decides to increases interest rates then it would have a loss on these assets 
(Krishnamurth and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011).  
Therefore, if a central bank purchases large quantities of long term assets this signals a credible 
commitment that interest rates would be low for a rather longer period of time. This however, 
could induce bank managers to decrease their lending standards and the risk monitoring of their 
operations. It is evident in the existing literature that low interest rates for a prolonged time 
soften lending standards (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011).  Banks tend 
to entail more risk-taking as low interest rates make riskless assets less attractive and thus 
financial institutions swift to riskier assets (Rajan, 2005). Low interest rates soften lending 
standards and decrease screening by banks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) and this in turn 
might prone financial institutions to less beneficial positions in terms of risk-return due to the 
increase of non-performing loans.  
Thus, the negative effect of UMP on bank performance would be even more pronounced under 
higher levels of UMPs. In addition, lower interest rates as discussed in the hypothesis section, 
decreases the difference between the long and short term interest rates, i.e., interest margins 
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(Gagnon, et al., 2013; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 
2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Therefore, since larger volumes of LSAPs signals longer 
duration of near-zero interest rates the negative impact on banks’ interest margins would be 
more robust than that of lower level of UMPs in quantitative terms. 
Our results in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions indicate the presence of negative 
effect of UMP on bank performance. Based on these first results and the discussion above, we 
believe that the negative effect of UMPs on bank performance would be more pronounced for 
larger volumes of UMPs compared to that of lower quantities of UMPs. Thus, we implement 
the dynamic panel threshold model introduced by Kremer et al. (2013) which allow us to 
identify the presence of potential threshold-effects of the unconventional monetary policy with 
respect to the US bank performance. The potential presence of threshold-effects would enable 
us to research in depth a period of significant structural changes for the banking institutions as 
well as for the entire economy. We employ this econometric method setting as threshold 
variable two alternative UMPs measures, CBA and EXC_RES.  
   
4.3.3 Threshold variable Central bank assets 
  
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the CBA to be 5.560105 (see Table 
5). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high regime 
includes all the observations whereby the level of the CBA, is above the 5.560105. By contrast, 
in the low regime belong all these observations for which the value of CBA is below 5.560105. 
Our findings suggest that the CBA exerts a strong negative impact on bank performance for 
both regimes. In particular, coefficient estimates with regards to the effect of central bank’s 
assets on bank performance are λ2= -4.075 for the high regime and λ1= -2.548 for the low 
regime (see Table 5). In some detail, we observe that CBA has a larger in magnitude impact 
on bank performance for banks that belong to the high regime compared to those that belong 
to the low regime. Thus, our findings confirm our expectations that the negative effect of UMP 
on bank performance would be more pronounced for banks under higher levels of the Fed’s 
asset purchases.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Likewise, we also observe a negative association between LIQ/TA and NPLs and bank 
performance. In addition, as in the previous findings, we also find a negative effect of FDIC 
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and a positive impact of the CBA*FDIC on performance. In addition, FDIC is found to have a 
particularly significant economic effect on bank performance (coef. -1.812). Similarly with our 
preceding results, CBA*FDIC exerts a positive and significant impact on bank performance. 
We also find that Z-Score and E/TA ratio exerts a positive impact on bank performance. 
Moreover, consistent with our previous findings we observe GDP gr, INFL and UNEMP exerts 
a negative effect on performance. Finally, we find that the Fed rate exerts a significant and 
positive impact on bank performance.   
Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that the initiation of unconventional expansionary policies is 
evident particularly in the third quarter of 2008, whereby the level of CBA was increased 
considerably compared to the previous period (2007Q2-2008Q2). In addition, we observe that 
the magnitude of the negative effect in the high regime refers to the 2011Q1-2013Q2 period, 
suggesting that the destabilizing impact of UMP on bank performance is more pronounced in 
this period. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.4 Threshold variable Excess Reserves 
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the EXC_RES to be 13.9947 (see 
Table 6). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high regime 
comprises all these observations where the EXC_RES is above the 13.9947. On the contrary, 
the low regime includes the rest observations for which the EXC_RES takes values below the 
threshold value, i.e., 13.9947. Our results show that the EXC_RES has a negative impact on 
bank performance for both regimes consistent with the previous section (4.3.3). In particular, 
we observe that in the high regime EXC_RES exerts a negative impact on bank performance, 
as λ2= -3.368, at the 1% significance level (see Table 6). Similarly, our findings show that in 
the low regime EXC_RES has a negative impact on bank performance, as λ1= -0.428, at the 
1% level of significance. Moreover, we observe that the impact of EXC_RES is larger in 
magnitude impact for the higher regime (λ2= -3.368) compared to that of the lower (λ1= -
0.428), confirming our previous findings (4.2.2). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, regarding the rest of the variables results are similar to the fixed effect and dynamic 
panel specifications. We find E/TA, SIZE, LA/TA and Z-Score exert a positive impact on bank 
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performance. In contrast, LIQ/TA, FDIC, NPLs, GDP gr, INFL and UEMP have a negative 
effect on bank performance. Finally, we observe that Fed rate and EXC_RES*FDIC enter the 
regression significant and positive.  
Turning now to Figure 2, we observe a huge growth of the level of excess reserves during the 
period under study. Notably, the level of excess reserves in 2007Q2 is almost half of it in 
2008Q3, indicating that the UMP has led to a significant increase of the EXC_RES. Likewise, 
we observe that the change in the magnitude of the negative effect of the UMP on bank 
performance occurs around the 2010Q4. This illustrates that the negative impact of UMP on 
performance is particularly evident between 2011Q1 and 2013Q2 when excess reserves are 
considerably high. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  4.4 The impact of UMPs on bank performance for banks of different asset and funding 
structure 
In this part, we report findings regarding the impact of UMP on bank performance, whilst 
taking into account two main US bank-specific characteristics: i) the asset diversification and 
ii) the total deposit funding.12 We split the sample accordingly: banks below 25th, between 25th 
and 75th percentile and banks above 75th percentile. So, we employ three models based on these 
three sub-samples of banks of low, medium and high level of asset diversification and deposit 
funding.13  
Our main motivation for this analysis arises from the fact that the US banking institutions are 
well-diversified institutions in both funding and asset structure terms. Previous empirical 
evidence suggests that interest based income that stems from loans is less volatile compared to 
the income that stems from non-interest bearing assets, such as derivatives and securities (see 
 
12We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for highlighting the importance of asset and funding structure 
for the US bank performance. We measure asset diversification by using the following formula: asset 
diversification= 1 − |
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠−𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
|, consistent with Laeven and Levine (2007). For the level of 
deposit funding we use the ratio of total deposits over total assets as in Beltratti and Stulz (2012). 
13Note that we sort the data of asset diversification and deposit to asset ratio with respect to the first year. In that 
way, we avoid any endogeneity issue arising from bank’s management decisions driven by the macroeconomic 
conditions including non-conventional monetary policies. 
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DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Lepetit et al., 2008). Similarly, banks that rely on trading activities 
experience higher losses compared to financial institutions that focus on traditional banking 
operations (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Also, DeJonghe (2010) demonstrates that banks that 
engage particularly in non-interest based operations are vulnerable to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. These findings illustrate that banks of various levels of asset 
diversification might react differently to changes in macroeconomic environment, including 
unconventional monetary policies.14  It is, therefore, of interest to investigate whether cross-
sectional variation in the asset diversification and the total deposit funding would alter the 
impact of UMP on bank performance.  
We employ dynamic panel analysis to exploit the cross-sectional variation of our data. As in 
the previous section, we use two-step system GMM estimation following Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) aiming to account for both endogeneity issues and the 
documented persistence of bank profits (Berger et al., 2000; Goddart et al., 2004; Athanasoglou 
et al., 2008). We also use a finite sample correction as developed by Widmeijer (2005) as two-
step estimates are likely to be downward biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Additionally, we 
use Hansen diagnostic test of overidentifying restrictions and the second order autocorrelation 
test of residuals introduced by Arellano and Bover (1991).15 This strategy is similar to that of 
other previous empirical studies that take into account the importance of cross-sectional 
variation in identifying differences in the effect of UMPs on institutions (Becker and Ivashina, 
2014; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Foley-Fisher et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015).  
Table 7 reports that UMP exerts a negative impact on bank performance across all three 
different sub-samples; banks of low, medium and high level of asset diversification. Thus, 
across all sub-samples we reveal that UMP would reduce bank performance, with the economic 
significance of this effect being similar across banks. Note that there is some variation on the 
 
14Moreover, banks that rely more on non-deposit funding than deposits could face higher funding costs as 
wholesale funders could impose enhanced monitoring and could withdraw their financing faster than depositors 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Some studies argue that market funding would negatively affect the 
stability of financial institutions in the event of liquidity shocks (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2008; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2009). The is so as banks that rely particularly on deposits are exposed to lower risk of 
drying-up in liquidity due to explicit (deposit insurance coverage) and implicit government guarantees (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). Given that previous findings suggest that 
differences in funding structure matter, it is warranted to examine whether there is variability on the impact of 
UMP on banks of different funding structure. 
15We include time effects in our models implying that we investigate cross-sectional differences of the impact of 
UMPs on bank profitability eliminating time variations. We also run the regression including the bank specific 
and macroeconomic variables (excluding time dummies). These results are available upon request. 
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significance level of such effects. In some detail, the interaction of central bank assets and asset 
diversification (CBA*ASSETDIV) exerts a negative and significant at 5% level in the medium 
and low level of asset diversification banks, and at 10% in the high level of asset diversification. 
A similar picture arises from the regression results where we employ as an alternative measure 
of UMPs the interaction of excess reserves with asset diversification (EXC_RES*ASSETDIV). 
The impact of UMP remains negative across all banks, but it is significant at 1% and 5% for 
banks that fall within the case of low and medium level of asset diversification respectively. 
As a consequence, from a statistical point of view, the negative effect of UMP on bank 
performance is somewhat less pronounced for banks of high level of asset diversification.  
It is well documented that UMPs would lead to lower lending rates and thereby to lower 
difference between lending and the deposit rates (Gagnon, et al., 2013; Swanson, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). 
This movement in lending rates would depress interest margin. Given that banks’ of low and 
medium asset diversification rely heavily on interest margins for their profitability, a reduction 
of interest margins would negatively affect their performance as a whole. Although, this result 
remains plausible for banks of high level asset diversification, and therefore of banks with a 
high share of non-interest based activities, it is less pronounced from a statistical point of view. 
Thus, banks of high level asset diversification would not be statistically affected by UMP as 
other banks that rely on interest margins.16  
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turning now to Table 8, we observe that the negative effect of the interaction of central bank 
assets with deposit to assets ratio (CBA*DEP/TA) has higher economic significance compared 
to results in Table 7 where asset diversification has been taken into account. This highlights 
previous findings where the importance of deposits, and in particular interest rate margin, for 
the transmission of monetary policy has been emphasised (Gagnon, et al., 2013; Swanson, 2011; 
 
16 As previously discussed in the hypothesis section, UMPs could restore market uncertainty (Bekaert et al., 2013; 
Roache and Rousset, 2013) and increase asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014). The positive impact of UMP on 
asset values can also be explained by the portfolio rebalancing theory (Tobin, 1958; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). 
Based on this theory, banks receive cash from the central bank and use these proceeds to buy trading assets such 
as securities. This in turn will give rise to the demand of these assets and increase their prices suggesting gains 
for banks of high level of asset diversification. Thus, those institutions that engage particularly in non-interest 
based assets are less adversely affected by UMP compared to banks of medium and low asset diversification.  
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Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). 
Indeed, present findings demonstrate that the UMP transition mechanism is particularly 
effective through its interaction with deposits. Table 8 reveals that banks high level of deposit 
funding, that is banks in the sub-sample of high level of deposits to total assets, are subject 
more to the adverse impact of UMP, as measured by CBA*DEP/TA, both in terms of economic 
and statistical significance compared to banks of either low or medium deposits to total assets. 
In particular, CBA*DEP/TA exerts a negative impact on performance of banks in low deposit 
to total assets sub-sample, but this is significant at 10%. In similar vein, the effect of the 
interaction of excess reserves with the deposit to assets ratio (EXC_RES*DEP/TA) on bank 
performance is negative and significant at 1% only for banks in the sub-sample of high deposit 
to total assets, though its economic significance is lower than that of banks in medium deposit 
to total assets. In the sub-sample of low deposits to total assets, again, the negative impact of 
UMP is significant only at 10%. This result, once more, confirms the importance for the 
transition of UMP of the net interest margin in line with the literature (Gagnon et al., 2013; 
Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2013). Moreover, reliance on wholesale funding might mitigate the impact of UMP 
on bank performance.17  
 [INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 As we discussed in the hypothesis section (2.1 Section), wholesale financiers charge higher interest rates than 
retail depositors aiming to discipline banking institutions (Calomiris, 1999). UMPs could restore wholesale 
financiers’ confidence, as injection of cash to depository institutions function as an implicit guarantee for the well-
functioning of the banking industry (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). This in turn suggests that banks of higher 
level of wholesale funding than deposit funding benefit more from a reduction of funding cost over expansionary 
monetary periods. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that unconventional monetary policy reduces bank performance. The 
dynamic panel threshold analysis further reveals that this negative relationship is pronounced 
above a reported threshold value. Similarly, an increase of deposit insurance coverage has 
important destabilization effects as it increases moral hazard and in turn decreases bank 
performance. We also find that the negative impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank 
performance is further enhanced for deposit uninsured financial institutions. On the contrary, 
the negative effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance is less pronounced 
for banks of higher level of asset diversification and low deposit funding.  
With regards to policy implications, our findings suggest that the Fed should enhance its 
attention on bank performance in an environment of very low interest rates, while bank 
managers and supervision should also take into account unconventional monetary policy 
consequences. Along these lines bank supervision should be reinforced so as to closely monitor 
bank performance’s response to unconventional monetary policy and use this as feedback to 
FED’s decision making. 
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Table 1. Variables Definition and Sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
A. Dep. Variables     
Return on assets (ROA) Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Bankscope 
Return on equity (ROE) Return on equity/ total assets Bankscope 
Net interest margin (NIM) 
Interest income minus interest expenses/interest 
earning assets 
Bankscope 
Pre-tax operating income (POI) Pre-tax operating assets/total assets Bankscope 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest   
Central bank’s assets (CBA) 
Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
Excess reserves (EXC_RES) 
The amount of money that a bank has on deposit with 
the Federal Reserve that is above what is required by 
the Federal Reserve. 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
Federal Deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) 
Bank specific dummy, that takes the value of 0 if 
banks' deposit are not insured by the Fed while 1 if 
banks' deposit are insured. 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
C. Other bank-specific    
Size Natural logarithm of real total assets   Bankscope 
E/TA Equity/total assets Bankscope 
LA/TA Loans/total assets Bankscope 
LIQ/TA Liquid assets/total assets Bankscope 
Z-Score 
(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity 
and sdROE is the standard deviation of return on 
equity (Boyd and Graham, 1986)  
Authors' estimation 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables   
GDP gr 
Gross Domestic product (GDP) changes from one 
year to another 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
INFL Inflation 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
UNEMPL Unemployment  
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
NPLs Non-performing loans (state level)/total loans 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
Fed rate Federal fund rate 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis with respect to 
bank performance. 
Variable  Mean Std. dv. Min. Max. 
A. Dependent Variables         
ROA       0.6 4.47 -72.49    35.51 
ROE       0.03 0.34  -9.93 8.00 
NIM       4.02 2.84 -427.00   406.15 
POI      17.4 15.31 -25.49   194.55 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest       
CBA  5.77 0.23 -5.62 4.6 
EXC_RES      14.06 1.04  7.38 14.68 
FDIC  0.67 0.47 0 1 
C. Bank-specific control variables     
Size  12.18 1.34  4.67 21.11 
E/TA    7.94 2.79 -11.75 12.99 
LA/TA  71.80  9.26 50.03 97.14 
LIQ/TA  72.56 13.64 51.68 99.54 
Z-Score  -1.27  1.84 -7.94 4.49 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables     
GDP gr  0.51 0.47     -2.11 1.12 
INFL  1.75 0.45 0.73 2.50 
UEMPL  8.34 0.89 4.50 9.50 
NPLs  2.74 1.37 0.12 9.32 
Fed rate  0.19 0.52 0.07 5.09 
Notes: our final sample includes 88888 observations after removing all errors and inconsistencies. The Table   
shows the basic descriptive statistics (mean, std.dv., min., max.) of all our dependent and independent variables. 
Our dependent variables are: ROA; ROE; NIM; POI. Our independent variables of our main variables are: CBA; 
EXC_RES; FDIC. Other bank-specific independent control variables: Size; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-Score; 
Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, Fed rate, GDP gr, INFL, UNEMP. 
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Table 3. The impact of UMP on the US bank performance (fixed effect regressions). 
Dependent 
 ROE  ROA  NIM POI 
Variables 
CBA -0.890*** 
  
-0.384***  -0.154**  -0.721**  
 (0.255) (0.117)  (0.069)  (0.318)  
EXC_RES  -0.707***  -0.240***  -0.684***  -0.291*** 
 (0.046)  (0.030)  (0.211)  (0.052) 
SIZE 0.982*** 0.996*** 0.559*** 0.572*** 0.163 0.150 0.195 0.137 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.170) (0.169) (0.133) (0.160) (0.553) (0.554) 
LA/TA 0.402*** 0.394*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.331*** 0.313*** 
 (0.109) (0.042) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.097) 
E/TA 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.026** 0.041** 0.067 0.068 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043) (0.043) 
LIQ/TA -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.755*** 0.760*** 0.819*** 0.820*** 0.093*** 0.111*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 
 (0.100) (0.139) (0.107) (0.177) (0.018) (0.014) (0.070) (0.069) 
FDIC -0.308* -0.441*** -0.372* -0.281*** -0.109** -0.149*** -0.952*** -0.313*** 
 (0.180) (0.123) (0.215) (0.061) (0.051) (0.045) (0.191) (0.104) 
CBA*FDIC 0.540* 
 
0.770 
 
0.185** 
 
0.161*** 
  (0.311) (0.487) (0.088) (0.033) 
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.140**  0.685*  0.655**  0.853*** 
  (0.069)  (0.392)  (0.265)  (0.196) 
Fed rate 0.368*** 0.126*** 0.356*** 0.146*** 0.184*** 0.096*** 0.791*** 0.549*** 
 (0.100) (0.032) (0.038) (0.025) (0.020) (0.014) (0.059) (0.052) 
NPLs -0.299*** -0.193*** -0.217*** -0.193*** -0.056*** -0.012 -0.009 -0.029 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.040) 
GDP gr -0.176*** -0.257*** -0.013 -0.018 -0.059*** 0.025*** -0.297*** -0.349*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.029) 
INFL -0.162*** -0.176*** -0.043** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.676*** -0.644*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.042) (0.143) 
UEMP -0.020 -0.092** -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.095*** -0.065 -0.026 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.042) (0.043) 
Constant 1.345*** 2.124*** -1.015*** 7.832*** 4.364*** 2.814 4.389*** 4.293*** 
 (0.358) (0.376) (0.235) (2.362) (1.706) (1.946) (0.637) (0.663) 
F-test 75.40*** 76.89*** 90.88*** 94.07*** 85.33*** 63.49*** 130.92*** 134.37*** 
Observations 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 
R-squared 0.140 0.1428 0.106 0.107 0.11 0.127 0.1684 0.169 
Number of 
banks 
6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
Notes: the Table shows fixed effect regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: Size; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-Score; Country 
level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UNEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The impact of UMP on the US bank performance (dynamic panel regressions). 
 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: Size; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country 
level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UNEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
ROA ROE NIM POI 
Variables 
L.ROA 0.584*** 0.572** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.957*** 0.970*** 0.926*** 0.941*** 
 (0.248) (0.244) (0.029)  (0.028) (0.169) (0.244) (0.097) (0.197) 
CBA -0.581*     -0.356*** -0.824*  -0.222**  
 (0.332) 
 (0.071)  (0.487)  (0.101)  
EXC_RES  -0.102*  -0.709*** -0.062*** -0.187* 
  (0.052)  (0.118)   (0.004)  (0.097) 
SIZE 0.173* 0.184* 0.204 0.192 0.083 0.123*** 0.300 0.322 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.295) (0.301) (0.081) (0.032) (0.225) (0.280) 
LA/TA 0.107 0.110 0.412*** 0.367*** 0.008** 0.007* 0.302 0.274 
 (0.081) (0.088) (0.108) (0.110) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.454) (0.255) 
E/TA 0.496* 0.494* 0.186*** 0.179*** 0.012 0.012*** 0.180 0.163 
 (0.279) (0.282) (0.027) (0.028) (0.010) (0.004) (0.148) (0.139) 
LIQ/TA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.232 0.171 0.787*** 0.765*** 0.056* 0.049*** 0.016 0.045** 
 (0.215) (0.136) (0.071) (0.074) (0.028) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) 
FDIC -0.546* -0.210* -0.318*** -0.141*** -0.319 -0.212*** -0.221** -0.179 
 (0.328) (0.121) (0.063) (0.036) (0.484) (0.035) (0.110) (0.164) 
CBA*FDIC 0.124*        0.648*** 0.606  0.482**  
 (0.072)  (0.122)  (0.709)  (0.239)  
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.263*  0.137*** 0.047***  0.366 
  (0.141)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.260) 
Fed rate 0.536*** 0.579*** 0.347*** 0.280*** 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.996*** 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.066) (0.035) (0.011) (0.033) (0.314) 
NPLs -0.124* -0.109* -0.275*** -0.247*** -0.061 -0.056*** -0.621 -0.535 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.086) (0.081) (0.068) (0.010) (0.407) (0.351) 
GDP gr -0.334 -0.013 -0.091*** -0.797*** -0.079*** -0.072** -0.235 -0.039 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.025) (0.245) (0.011) (0.034) (0.212) (0.029) 
INFL -0.106 0.011 -0.006 -0.262 -0.018* -0.033* 0.586 -0.541*** 
 (0.095) (0.068) (0.005) (0.233) (0.010) (0.017) (0.395) (0.125) 
UEMP -0.040 -0.055 -0.116 -0.205** -0.008 -0.003* -0.121 -0.133 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.139) (0.390) (0.023) (0.002) (0.113) (0.123) 
Constant 1.397*** 3.333*** 1.718*** 2.341** 6.361*** 3.249*** 2.137*** 3.403*** 
 (0.105) (0.741) (0.437) (0.394) (0.669) (0.761) (0.536) (0.362) 
Wald test 240.09*** 296.52*** 760.87*** 734.46*** 5892.85*** 113.09*** 493.64*** 511.05*** 
Hansen(p-value) 0.377 0.179 0.522 0.183 0.179 0.146 0.526 0.273 
AR(2) 0.114 0.218 0.316 0.465 0.612 0.327 0.197 0.184 
Number of banks 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
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Table 5.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Central bank’s assets as 
threshold variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
CBA 5.560105 
95% confidence interval (5.560105-5.560105) 
Impact of CBA 
                                               
S.E                   
λ1 -2.548*** 0.662 
λ2 -4.075*** 1.019 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.110 
SIZE  0.286** 0.113 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.041*** 0.010 
Z-Score  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC -1.812** 0.864 
CBA*FDIC  0.302** 0.148 
Fed rate  0.144 0.103 
NPLs -0.138*** 0.032 
GDP gr -0.072* 0.047 
INFL -0.010 0.048 
UNEMP -0.123** 0.055 
δ  0.355** 0.181 
Observations 82117   
Low regime 6384  
High regime 75733   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the observations 
(Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance  (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose the Central bank’s assets (𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖𝑡) which represents unconventional monetary easing. Following 
Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our independent variables 
of our main interest: CBA; FDIC, CBA*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: Size; E/TA; LA/TA; 
LIQ/TA; Z-Score; Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UNEMP, Fed rate. We check that 
there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Excess Reserves as threshold 
variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
EXC_RES 13.9947 
95% confidence interval (13.9947-14.2927) 
Impact of EXC_RES                                                    
λ1 -0.428*** 0.112 
λ2 -3.368*** 0.872 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.100 
SIZE  0.303** 0.116 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.039*** 0.010 
Z-Score  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC -1.806** 0.620 
EXC_RES*FDIC  0.123** 0.043 
Fed  rate  0.148 0.096 
NPLs -0.150*** 0.030 
GDP gr -0.137** 0.047 
INFL -0.181** 0.075 
UNEMP -0.162** 0.059 
δ  0.402** 0.181 
Observations 82117   
Low regime 19426  
High regime 62691   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the observations 
(Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance  (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose excess reserves (𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖𝑡) which represents unconventional monetary easing. Following Bick (2007), 
the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our independent variables of our main 
interest: EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: Size; E/TA; LA/TA; 
LIQ/TA; Z-Score; Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UNEMP, Fed rate. We check that 
there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Dynamic panel results of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance based on asset 
diversification classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA 
Low level of asset 
diversification 
Medium level of asset 
diversification 
High level of asset 
diversification 
L.ROA 0.428*** 0.365** 0.069** 0.094* 0.179*** 0.196*** 
     (0.143)   (0.164)   (0.021)   (0.051) (0.049) (0.043) 
CBA*ASSETDIV -0.316**   -0.301**    -0.289* 
   (0.141) 
   (0.135)  (0.159)  
EXC_RES*ASSETDIV   -0.429***   -0.665**  -0.171 
 
   (0.155)    (0.276)  (0.136) 
SIZE       0.189 0.163** 0.028 0.252   0.069 0.374* 
   (0.172)   (0.071)   (0.019)   (0.232) (0.045) (0.220) 
LA/TA      0.844    0.367 0.035 0.028 0.136*** 0.019 
   (0.751)   (0.225)   (0.047)   (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) 
E/TA 0.284** 0.224*** 0.139 0.137 0.184*** 0.163*** 
   (0.137) (0.071)   (0.091)   (0.088) (0.045) (0.062) 
LIQ/TA -0.004**  -0.001 -0.014** -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.000)   (0.006)   (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.284** 0.141*** 0.387*** 0.493*** 0.300** 0.615*** 
   (0.134) (0.049)   (0.108)   (0.074) (0.139) (0.114) 
ASSETDIV 0.257** 0.975*** 0.114** 0.876** 0.101*  0.304* 
 (0.126) (0.356)   (0.044)   (0.389) (0.057) (0.182) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.363* 2.834*** 3.544*** 5.444*** 2.993*** 3.139*** 
 (0.176) (0.103) (2.974) (2.118) (0.256) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 176.37*** 111.02*** 154.13*** 1349.46*** 806.59*** 760.11*** 
Observations 22448 22448 36660 36660 29780 29780 
Hansen(p-value) 0.515 0.132 0.185 0.125 0.212 0.462 
AR(2) 0.697 0.180 0.595 0.904 0.381 0.328 
Number of banks 2194 2194 3558 3558 1019 1019 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level of 
bank asset diversification (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our independent variables 
of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES*ASSETDIVE (interaction terms). Other bank-specific 
independent control variables: Size; E/TA; SIZE; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; ASSETDIV. Hansen test is the p-
value of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the 
variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Dynamic panel results of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance based on 
deposits over total assets ratio classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA 
Low level of 
deposits/total assets 
Medium level of 
deposits/total assets 
High level of deposits/total 
assets 
L.ROA 0.493** 0.509** 0.101*** 0.065* 0.068*** 0.046** 
 (0.227) (0.219) (0.016) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) 
CBA*DEP/TA -0.836*  -0.673**  -0.920***  
 (0.503) 
 (0.301)  (0.159)  
EXC_RES*DEP/TA  -0.210*  -0.325**  -0.137*** 
 
 (0.116)  (0.071)  (0.031) 
SIZE 0.131 0.107 0.187** 0.013 0.049 0.081 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.077) (0.085) (0.099) (0.109) 
LA/TA 0.224* 0.231* 0.022*** 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
E/TA 0.153 0.130 0.293*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.050) (0.548) (0.032) 
LIQ/TA -0.002 -0.002 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.289*** 0.464*** 0.548*** 0.576*** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.041) 
DEP/TA 0.402** 0.288* 0.358** 0.181** 0.387*** 0.839* 
 (0.192) (0.153) (0.175) (0.100) (0.094) (0.477) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.243*** 2.598*** 2.645*** 6.001*** 2.390*** 3.412*** 
 (0.176) (0.243) (0.826) (1.718) (0.146) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 115.29*** 124.85*** 114.56*** 331.94*** 1709.26*** 1699.11*** 
Observations 22963 22963 46465 46465 19421 19421 
Hansen(p-value) 0.141 0.256 0.472 0.530 0.467 0.608 
AR(2) 0.118 0.116 0.219 0.174 0.137 0.231 
Number of banks 1586 1586 3398 3398 1787 1787 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level of 
bank deposits over total assets ratio (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our independent 
variables of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES* DEP/TA (interaction terms). Other bank-specific 
independent control variables: Size; E/TA; SIZE; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; DEP/TA. Hansen test is the p-value 
of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables 
used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
